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I. INTRODUCTION
Africa is now at the center of the world food and hunger dis­
cussions because there is growing support for the view that the 
basic problem - the food production gap - has been building up for 
.several decades and it will require a minimum of 10-15 years to 
solve it (Eicher, 1982). The selection of Food Security in Africa 
as the theme for a meeting of Deans of Faculties of Agriculture is 
timely because this is the tenth anniversary of the 1974 World Food 
Conference in Rome, a ministerial-level meeting called to deal with 
what was perceived to be a world food crisis. Although the world 
food crisis vanished a few years after the Rome conference, the food 
production crisis in Africa is real. Moreover, Africa's food produc­
tion problem will not vanish through short term responses such as 
increasing aid, policy dialogues and the preparation of fooa 
strategy statements.
Concept of Food Security
The concept of food security gained international attention 
during the Rome conference; -it dominated the entire meeting. Today 
food security - like farming systems research - is a household word 
in the development literature and in policy dialogues between donors 
and aid recipients. Food security can be broadly defined as "the 
ability of food-deficit countries or regions or householas within 
these countries to meet target levels of consumption on a yearly 
basis" (Siamwalla & Valdes, 1984). There are four components 
(cornerstones) of a national strategy to achieve food security:
2efficient growth of food and agricultural production
employment and income-generating opportunities to enable 
rural and urban people to purchase an improved diet
access to food to ensure that the entire population can 
satisfy subsistence food requirements
adequate grain reserves, and/or reliable trading agreements 
for protection against bad harvests, national disasters and 
uncertain world food supplies!/.
II. PLAN OF PAPER
Because Africa is so large and its agriculture is so complex and 
diversified, I shall focus on one of the four components - increasing 
food production - of a national strategy to increase food security.
I begin by examining the changing perspectives on global food secu­
rity since the 1974 Rome Conference and then analyze Africa's current 
food security problems within the global context. The core of my 
paper is devoted to an analysis of the role of technology transfer 
in increasing food production and food security. Technology transfer 
is an appealing and emotional concept; it forms a central link in 
the global agricultural research system and it is a key component of 
strategies to increase agricultural production in Africa. Moreover, 
technology transfer is an article of faith among most international 
food agencies and the 35 donors supporting the Consultative Group for 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Washington based 
organization that provides policy direction for the 13 International 
Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs). Through case studies, I shall 
examine technology transfer in theory and practice. I conclude by 
discussing five major issues for further debate and analysis by 
African states, international and regional research institutes and 
donors.
1/ These objectives are widely endorsed with varying degrees of 
emphasis by Timmer, et al (1983); Timmer (1984); Siamwalla and 
Valdes (1984); World Food Council (1984) and the FAO (1983).
3III. GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY: 1974-84
The 1974 World Food Conference was called because of the imme­
diate threat of famine in the Indian sub-continent and the Sahelian 
region in West Africa, the drawdown of world food reserves to their 
lowest levels in 25 years and a dramatic increase in food prices 
over the 1972-74 period (WFC, 1984). The. overriding assumption in 
the minas of many conference delegates was that real food prices 
would continue to rise in the 1970s and that mass starvation was a 
distinct possibility because of rapid population growth and the lack 
of global reserves.
The Rome answer to lagging food production was to urge food- 
deficit countries to mobilize political support for the food and 
agriculture sectors, to set up the International Fund for Agricul­
tural Development (IFAD) to attract more aid for agriculture and to 
expand the global agricultural research system. The conference 
adoptea an annual target of a 4 percent growth rate of food produc­
tion in Third World countries. Since there was reasonable confidence 
about the technical means.to increase production, it was assumed that 
"the worst aspects qf hunger could be eradicated in a decade and the 
threat of starvation could be virtually eliminated" (WFC, 1984, p.l).
Looking back over the past ten years, some important lessons 
have been learned about nature of food and hunger problems, and the 
perils of forecasting:
The major assumption of the 1974 conference - the world was 
entering a period of rising real food prices - was proved 
to be ill-founded. Cereal production recovered slowly in 
the late 1970s and the record world harvests of 1981 and 
1982 depressed the real market prices for cereals to their 
lowest levels in 30 years. Today, there is ample food at 
the global level, depressed grain prices and unmarketable 
production in North America and the European Community.
Global food production has made major strides in the past 
decade: the world is feeding nearly 1 billion more people
in 1984 than in 1974 and there is ample food produced 
globally for all the world's people.
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- There is now a better scientific understanding of the
nature and extent of malnutrition. The hunger problem is 
no longer perceived to be a lack of protein but primarily 
a lack of calories (undernourishment) which, in turn, is 
closely linked to poverty. Most diets will meet protein 
requirements as long as enough calories are consumed 
(Payne, 1978).
The emphasis on nutrition has now shifted from a concern 
for protein to direct measures to assist vulnerable groups 
and measures to increase employment and income earning 
opportunities so that people can produce more of their own 
calories or purchase more calories in the market.
There is no agreement on the number of poor and under­
nourished in the-world. The estimates of three leading 
food organizations are as follows: 450 million, FAO; 840
million, IFPRI; and 1.3 billion, World Bank (WFC, 1984, 
p.4). Whichever estimate one accepts, it is staggering 
when compared with the 1974 Conference theme that hunger 
could be eliminated within a decade.
Asia has made rapid strides in increasing food production 
since 1974. Even though 2/3 of the world's poor and under­
nourished are in Asia, international concern for food and 
hunger problems has slowly shifted from Asia to Africa 
since the Rome conference (WFC, 1984).
In summary, concern over a world food shortage and rising real 
prices of food vanished several years ago. The major food issues 
today are world food surpluses, hundreds of millions of poor and 
undernourished and Africa's chronic food deficits.
IV. AFRICA'S FOOD SITUATION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Despite enormous physical potential to produce food and record 
levels of foreign aid, Africa has slowly lost its ability to feed 
itself. Moreover, Africa's population growth rate is expected to 
remain high - around 3% - for the rest of the century. With little 
political support for family planning, Africa's "population tread­
mill" will grind out several hundred million more people by the close 
of this century. The highlights of Africa's current food situation
are:
Per capita food production has been declining for about 15 
years.
5Africa's annual population growth rate of around 3% will 
lead to a doubling of population within the next 20-25 
years. In a few countries with growth rates approaching 4 
percent (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe), the population doubling 
time will be 17 to 20 years.
Foreign exchange shortages - although small in contrast to 
financial problems in Latin America - are a major constraint 
on the ability of African states- to import food on commer­
cial terms.
The combination of rapid population growth, declining per 
capita food production and foreign exchange constraints, 
leads to a simple conclusion - many African states will 
require food imports on a concessional basis well into the 
future (USDA, 1984).
The FAO identified 24 African countries with food emer­
gencies in 1983/84. This group had total cereal import 
requirements of 5.3 million metric tons. Because of 
foreign exchange constraints, the 24 countries will import 
about 2 million tons on commercial terms, leaving 3.3 
million tons that will depend on food aid.
Nigeria and South Africa are key countries in Africa's food 
equation. Nigeria will increase its commercial food imports 
by 20 percent this year. South Africa, historically a major 
grain exporter (South Africa exported nearly 5 million tons 
of grain ih 1982) was forced to curtail grain exports this 
yea!r-; it will import 3 million tons of grain or more during 
1984/85. South Africa is now a net food importer for the 
first time since World War II.
To deal with its food crisis, African states have requested 
increased aid and donors have responded dramatically over the past 
decade to the point where per capita aid levels are, by a large mar­
gin, the highest in the world (Eicher, 1983 and Lele, 1983). But in 
the past few years, aid flows have leveled off in real terms. More­
over, there is growing concern among donors that increased attention 
should oe devoted to macro policies for food and agriculture. For 
example, the World Food Council has urged African states to prepare 
food strategies. Today, 32 of the 50 countries implementing natio­
nal food strategies in the world are African nations. Donors are 
also pressing for policy dialogue and policy reform as a precondition 
for aid. For example, Edgard Pisani, EEC's Commission for Develop^- 
ment, recently stated that because the project approach was failing
6to increase food production in Africa "from now on" the EEC is 
"going to finance policies - hence the term policy dialogue" (1984,
p .68)M
V. INCREASING FOOD PRODUCTION IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Background
By year 2000 there will be few areas in most African states where
' agricultural production can be increased by expanding the area under
cultivation. As a result, the focus of agricultural research and
extension programs will have to shift to yield-increasing-biological
and chemical technology. Research and policy attention should also
focus on reducing the dependency on rainfall through an evolutionary
process of bringing more land under irrigation over a time-span of
many decades. In short, African agriculture is at a crossroads in
the transition from land extensive (surplus) farming systems to a
science-based intensification of- agricultural production. There is
growing agreement among technical scientists that although the:
Green Revolution successes of IRRI and CIMMYT provided dramatic . 
support for the1 establishment of additional IARCs we are now 
faced with a much slower and more laborious process: of pushing
up yields, step by step, a little at a time. (Simmonds, 1984, p.6)
In my judgement, expanding agricultural production is the overarching
issue facing agricultural policy makers, planners and educators for
the rest of this century. I shall now discuss the three stages of
technology transfer and the potential role of technology transfer in
2/helping increase food production over the next 10-15 years.—
1/ For similar views on the need for agricultural policy reforms 
see the Berg report (World Bank, 1981); the Nordic View (Nordic 
Group, 1984); the U.S. View (Schultz, 1984).
2/ I have drawn on Eicher & Baker (1982) and Eicher (1983) for this 
section.
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The rationale for technology transfer is based on two simple 
premises,. First, because of scarce resources, it is impossible to 
fund a research effort on every commodity in every country. Second, 
a "critical mass" cf scientists is needed td produce new knowledge 
threugh basic - and td a lesser degree - applied research. This 
critical mass ccncept was central in the decisicn cf the British 
cclcnial service tc launch the Empire Cottcn Grcwing Asscciaticn in 
1921. Cotton researchers were concentrated in key ceuntries in 
Africa - and in ether continents - and linked threugh a glcbal 
cottcn research network (Anthony et al 1979). Later, global and 
regicnal commodity research networks (e.g. West African Cocoa 
Research Institute) were developed by the French and British in 
Africa (Eicher, 1967). By focusing on a commodity or a problem that 
was common in many countries, the colonial governments were able to 
finance a "critical mass of scientists" in a single location. In 
theory, technology transfer can play a crucial role in diffusing the 
results ef research prcduced in "critical mass" research centers. 
Because many African ceuntries have small peels ef trained manpower 
(Table 1) they., by necessity, must rely heavily on imported 
technelegy. Finally, because agricultural production is a location 
specific process there is a need fer adaptive research tc adapt 
technclcgy tc mega environments.
Stages cf Technelegy Transfer.
Hayemi and Ruttan, have classified technclcgy transfer accerding
to three interrelated stages:
Material (direct) transfer - direct transfer ef materials 
such as seeds, machinery, pesticides, cattle and 
fertilizer.!/ Local adaptive research (e.g. fertilizer 
trials (B.Sc. and M.Sc.)) is eften required tc develep 
lccaticn specific reccmmendations fer the use of the 
imported technolcgy.
1/ The idea cf direct technclogy transfer gained instant credibility 
among development practitioners in the late 1940s when the U.S. Point 
IV Program was established and "agricultural extensicn advisors 
swarmed ever the cevelcping wcrld in the 1950s, bringing US and 
European 'know how' to the farmers of the tropics." (Evenson, 1984).
Design Transfer - transfer of designs, blueprints, 
formulas, books, computer software, etc. Local training 
enables scientists to carry out adaptive research (e.g.
FSR) to more effectively use-the imported technology.
Capacity Transfer - investment to Ph.D. level training to 
create an indigenous capacity to provide scientific and 
technical leadership in the public and private sectors for 
national agricultural development. Investment in 
libraries, laboratories, computers and equipment is 
necessary to attract and retain scientists to carry out 
basic and applied research. Due to the long-term pay off 
to these investments, consistent funding is needed for 
20-30 years to build this local capacity.
Hayemi & Ruttan, 1976, p.175.
I shall now analyze technology transfer in practice in Africa by 
examining crop and animal improvement programs in historical and 
contemporary perspective.
Technology Transfer in Practice 
Historical Experience
The role of international technology transfer is illustrated by 
the history of crop improvement research on three crops - oil palm, 
cotton ano maize - in Africa over a period of many decades.. The 
development of hybrid oil palms represented a spectacular Green 
Revolution-type of breakthough in Africa. The demand for oil palm 
research is directly linked to Sir William Lever's decision to esta­
blish plantations in the Congo in the 1920s after Lord Lugard, the 
Governor of Nigeria, rejected his request,to..establish therein 
Nigeria. In 1926, the Belgian colonial office set up an oil palm 
research station in the Congo to carry out basic and applied research 
to assist plantation development. Over a period of several decades, 
hybrid palms were developed by crossing local varieties with plant 
material from Indonesia. Nigeria's oil palm station was established 
in 1939 and it drew heavily on plant material from the Congo 
(Hartley, 1958). Hybrid palms were developed for local conditions 
in Nigeria and they outyielded wild palms by 500 to 700 percent 
under smallholder conditions (Eicher, 1967). The emergence of the 
Ivory Coast as the leading palm producer in West Africa in the 1970s
9is partially a function of the improved plant material supplied by 
the IRHO research network.
Cotton research in Africa is an accumulation of eight decades of 
experience starting with Uganda's importation of Upland types from 
the United States in 1904;, Several decades later, the Samaru station 
in northern Nigeria imported the Allen variety of Upland cotton and 
adapted it to local conditions. The Empire Cotton Growing Corpora­
tion was started by the British in 1921 and it became the forerunner 
of the concept of research networks that were subsequently launched 
by the Belgian and French colonial governments and later by the IARCs 
beginning in the 1960s (Anthony, et al 1979). Under the leadership 
of French cotton researchers and the French Cotton Development Orga­
nization - CFDT - cotton has become an important crop in the Ivory 
Coast, Mali and Upper Volta.
Maize is the dominant staple in many countries in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Two examples from Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rho­
desia) and Kenya illustrate the time and the continuity of investiga­
tion to develop high-yielding hybrid varieties and the differing 
roles that material (direct) technology transfer played in thei
breeding programs in each country. In 1932, research on hybrid 
maize was launched in Southern Rhodesia by H. C. Arnold; in 1938, 
A.G.R. Rattray took over the research program and continued it for 
30 years until he retired from government service in 1968.—^ In 
1949, seventeen years after hybrid maize research was initiated', the 
first hybria, SR-1, was released to farmers and Southern Rhodesia 
became the first country after the United States to produce.hybrid
1/ A.G.R. Rattray is still an active maize breeder at a private re­
search station (Rattray Arnold Research Station) financed by the Zim­
babwe Seed Cooperative outside Harare. Rattray's 46 years of hybrid 
maize breeding is probably unique among maize breeders anywhere in 
the world. In terms of continuity, four research officers have 
directed Zimbabwe's maize programs over a period spanning 54 years: 
H.C. Arnold (1932-38); A.G.R. Rattray (1938-68); P. Nelson (1965-70) 
and R. Olver (1970-1984).
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corn commercially.—^ But the big breakthrough came eleven years
later in 1960 when a high yielding, long season (150 day) white dent
- SR 52 - was released. Subsequently, SR 52 seed was sold and is
still being sold to neighboring countries today. Moreover, SR 52 is
2/still the dominant variety used by commercial farmers—  in Zimbabwe 
24 years after its release in 1960. SR 52 is undoubtedly the Green 
Revolution success story in Southern Africa. But it is significant 
to note that imported germplasm has not played a significant role in 
Zimbabwe's maize research program over the past fifty years. Most 
hybrids in Zimbabwe are derived from two local varieties known as 
Southern Cross and Salisbury White. These varieties had been grown 
for a long time and continually mass selected in the Rhodesian 
Highlands. SR 52 is a single cross hybrid and its two parental 
lines were developed independently by two researchers H.C. Arnold 
and A. Rattray (Gelaw, 1984).
In Kenya, research on hybrid maize began in the mid-1950s at the 
urging of large-scale European farmers. The following synopsis indi­
cates that material (direct) technology transfer played a central 
role in hybrid development:
1/ Surprisingly there was almost no intellectual exchange or ex­
change of plant material between hybrid maize breeders in the United 
States and .those in Southern Rhodesia during the 1930s and 1940s. 
Southern Rhodesia encouraged its scientists to travel and interact 
with scientists in the,other parts of the world beginning in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. (Rattray,"1984)
2/ An early (130 day) maize hybrid - R201 - is now widely used by 
communal farmers (small-holders); it has been the most important 
variety in terms of area planted in Zimbabwe since around 1980.
Seed packs of treated seed are available in retail seed shops and 
co-ops throughout the country in 2, 5, 10, 25 and 50 kg units in 
order to encourage farms of any size to plant hybrids. Hybrid seed 
sales have shot up 60 percent since independence in 1980 as communal 
farmers have eagerly adopted hybrids. In short, hybrid maize is a 
"self-spreading" innovation in Zimbabwe. Historically, communal 
farmers never sold more than 80,000 tons of maize until 1981. In 
1981, this figure shot up to 324,000 tons and 400,000 tons in 1982=; 
Now the challenge is to increase small holder yields of one ton 
compared with roughly four tons per hectare on commercial farms.
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The Kenya government, with Rockefeller Foundation support, hired 
Michael Harrison as a maize breeder to work at Kitale Research 
Station- His early work with local varieties had resulted in 
only mixed success in increasing yields. Then following his AID 
and Rockefeller-sponsored trip to Mexico to collect new maize 
breeding lines, Harrison's luck changed. In experiments invol­
ving some 200 lines, he crossed an Ecuadorian line - Ecuador 573 
- with the best local variety, Kitale Synthetic II and the 
resulting hybrid, H611, produced a remarkable 40% increase in 
yield and proved appropriate to the high potential areas of 
Kenya, with their fertile soils, abundant rainfall and moderate 
temperatures. (AID, 1983a, pp.1-2).
The time period for the development of the H611 was roughly a decade 
- 1955 to 1964. Later research produced improved hybrids and compo­
sites tailored to different elevations. Kenya's hybrid maize 
research program is regarded as the food crop success story in 
Eastern Africa. Although the original pressure for hybrid research 
came from large farmers, the results have benefitted both smallhol­
ders and large farmers.
In West Africa, maize is a minor crop relative to millet and 
sorghum - the staple foods in rural areas and rice and wheat in the 
cities. Smallholder maize yields are low - 200 and 900 kg/ha - 
compared with maximbm yields of 8 tons/ha on research stations . 
(Matlon, 1983). For reasons that are unclear, CIMMYT, ITTA, IRAT 
and national research and extension services have been ineffective 
in producing maize varieties that are "self spreading" like those in 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. Perhaps one reason is that a sustained maize 
breeding program has not been carried out in West Africa over a 
period of several decades. Plant breeding is partially an art; it 
takes an unusual person to accept that fact- that a minimum of a 
decade of work will probably be needed before a significant payoff 
is forthcoming.
To summarize, these case studies provide two insights into the
role of technology transfer in crop improvement programs:
Material (direct)., technology transfer of genetic material 
has played a central role in oil palm and cotton 
improvement programs, especially when viewed over a period 
of several decades. The record on maize is mixed.
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In Zimbabwe, local breeders developed hybrid maize over a 
period of several decades by the mass selection of two 
(local) open pollinated varieties. In Kenya, a wide range 
of Latin American plant material was crossed with local 
material. In West Africa, there has been little improve­
ment in maize technical packages for decades.
Crop improvement programs should be conceptualized in 
time-scales of decades rather than years.
Technology Transfer: Contemporary Experience
In this analysis of technology transfer, I shall concentrate on 
food crops and livestock improvement programs. Four international 
regional institutes dominate food crop research in Africa: IRAT,
IITA, ICRISAT and WARD A. Since IRAT's experience in developing new 
food crop technologies appropriate to the needs of smallholders in 
West Africa has been recently analyzed by Vallaeys and Silvestre, 
( 1 9 8 3 ) I shall concentrate on the three institutes in the CGIAR 
system, IITA, ICRISAT and WARDA.
. The International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) was 
established in 1967 near Ibadan and it has been beset with problems 
since the early debate over whether it should be located in the 
Savannah zone in the Middle Belt of Nigeria or near Ibadan - a 
transition zone between the humid tropical forest and the savannah. 
Some of the considerations that led to the Ibadan location included 
its proximity to the University of Ibadan, and reliable schooling 
and medical facilities.
Since IITA was opened a few months after IRRI had released its 
high-yielding rice variety - IR-8 - after only 6 years of research 
(1960-66), it is understandable that some of the IITA scientists 
were optimistic about bringing about a Green Revolution in Africa in 
a relatively short period of time. Eight years after IITA was 
launchea, it appeared that IITA was on the verge of some break­
throughs. In 1975, D.J. Greenland, Director of Research, IITA, 
published an article in the prestigious Science magazine on
1/ The authors report that.IRAT has not produced any breakthroughs 
in food crop research in West Africa.
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bringing the Green Revolution to shifting cultivators. Greenland
reported on promising IITA research on zero tillage and legumes with
nitrogen fixing rhizobia. He contended that although the ingredients
of a farming system for the small farmer in the lowland humid tropics
have not been put together and tested as a whole,
"fortunately this is not an essential preliminary to their use.
All are compatible with existing systems of shifting cultivation 
and introduction of any one or more of these into the system 
should lead to immediate though not always dramatic improvements 
in production"...we can expect higher and more stable production 
to come quietly but quickly to small,, farmers throughout the world 
and have a more lasting effect than the first phase of the Green 
Revolution" (Greenland, 1975, p.844).
Three years later, however, the TAC Review Mission observed that 
IITA was experiencing problems in recruiting and retaining a core of 
senior scientists. It further noted that because IITA was facing 
some of "the broadest, most complex and challenging" problems of the 
IARCs, it should consolidate its activities and leave a number of 
activities to be carried out by national research programs (TAC,
1978).
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After years of laudable effort by many IITA scientists and
i
cumulative core.operating and. capital expenditures of around $170 
million (1965-1983), it seems fair to ask whether IITA has delivered 
on its research mandate. IITA's research on high yielding varieties 
of cassava combining resistance to bacterial blight disease and 
African mosaic virus has been outstanding and its research on streak£V 
resistance maize germplasm is an important contribution. IITA's 
research on early cowpea varieties (55 to 60 day) is encouraging but 
the varieties are not ready for release to farmers. However, the 
IITA is promoting tie ridging as a new concept even though it was 
promoted by colonial research services back in the 1940s. Although 
IITA scientists have concentrated on developing improved farming 
systems in the humid and sub-humid tropics since IITA was 
establishea, no breakthroughs are on the horizon. IITA scientists 
qualify their progress by noting that "no till" farming technology 
"appears to be a viable alternative to the current bush fallow 
system" (Singh, 1984, p.4). A 1983 external review panel praised
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Director-General Hartmans and his staff for their "significant 
achievements" but cautioned IITA about getting involved in too many 
agricultural development projects because there is a danger that its 
basic mission-agricultural research - will suffer (TAC, 1983, p.18). 
Although the IITA has been rejuvenated under the dynamic leadership 
of Director-General Hartmans, the verdict is still out on whether 
IITA can achieve the big breakthroughs that have been promised for 
almost two decades.—^
I shall now examine sorghum and millet because these crops 
constitute about 2/3 of the total cultivated area in the West 
African Semi-Arid Tropics in 1980 and they are important in the 
Sudan and in Southern Africa. I shall concentrate on ICRISAT's 
experience in West Africa over the past decade and its current 
effort to launch a long term research program in the SADCC states of 
Southern Africa. Historically, two major research strategies have 
been pursued to increase sorghum and millet yields ana yield 
stability in West Africa. The first strategy - improving local 
varieties through mass selection - was pursued for several decades
by colonial researchers at the Samaru research station in Northern
' 2/
Nigeria ana the Bambey Station, in Senegal.—  Because this 
strategy did not produce high yielding varieties, it is 
understanaable that, in the aftermath of the 1968-74 Sahelian 
drought, ICRISAT was invited to develop a sorghum and millet 
improvement progranf-for West Africa. ICRISAT's West African program 
was launched in mid 1975 by posting scientists in Upper Volta, 
Senegal and Nigeria and later in Niger and Mali. ICRISAT pursued 
the first stage of technology transfer (material transfer) and 
imported improved varieties—^ because it was assumed that imported 
material woula aiversify the genetic stock in West Africa and speed 
up the process of developing high yielding varieties appropriate to 
the needs of smallholders. I recall my October 1975 conversation
1/ For an internal view of IITA's achievements see ter Kuile (1983) 
and Singh (1984).
2/ Millet research was launched at Bambey, Senegal in 1931.
3/ The material was mainly of Indian, Nigerian and Ugandan origin.
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with C.M. Pattanayak, ICRISAT's Team Leader at the research station 
outside Bobo Dioulasso in southern Upper Volta. At that time. Dr. 
Pattanayak was optimistic that ICRISAT's direct transfer strategy 
could develop yielding varieties for release to farmers in 4 to 5 
years. But eight years after ICRISAT launched its West Africa 
program, Pattanayak reported that "variations in rainfall, soils, 
and farming conditions" probably explain why the direct transfer of 
high yielding sorghum and millet varieties to West Africa has been 
"relatively unsuccessful at the farmers' level" (1983, p.14). An 
ICRISAT agricultural economist added that "the improved sorghum and 
millet varieties which have experienced relatively more success 
...are improved locals derived from West African genetic stock" 
(Matlon, 1983, p.35). ICRISAT has also learned that the dispersion 
of 22 scientists over five countries in West Africa presented 
administrative and management problems and made it difficult for the 
dispersed breeders and agronomists to receive adequate inputs from 
other disciplines (ICRISAT, 1983, p.20).
Drawing on its disappointing experience with direct technology 
transfer and the dispersion of its scientists throughout West Africa, 
ICRISAT developed a new research strategy for Africa which deempha- 
sizes the direct transfer of technology, promises of short term 
breakthroughs and dispersion of staff (ICRISAT, 1979 and 1983). The 
new strategy is cast in a 20 to 25 year time frame and it involves a 
concentration of- researchers at three to four Regional Research 
Centers in Africa. ICRISAT is implementing its new Regional strategy 
by developing a Sahelian Center about 45 km. outside of Niamey,
Niger. About a dozen senior scientific staff will be working in 
three interdisciplinary groups at the Sahelian Center on millet, 
groundnut and farming systems. ICRISAT's sorghum scientists are 
being regrouped and posted in two locations - Ahmadu Bello 
University in northern Nigeria and in Upper Volta.
Multi-disciplinary teams at ICRISAT's regional centers will 
carry out basic and applied research to develop varieties that are 
resistant to disease and insects and have agronomic superiority, 
yield stability and food quality traits preferred by local
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consumers. Plant breeders at the Regional Centers will carry out a 
dual strategy of importing plant material from throughout the world, 
screening local varieties and crossing local with imported 
varieties. The regional team will carry out multilocational variety 
trials in cooperation with scientists in national programs. The 
agronomist from the Regional Center will work with local FSR teams 
in carrying out on-farm trials of promising varieties and technical 
packages.
Turning to ICRISAT's work in Southern Africa, in 1980, the nine 
member countries of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Council (SADCC), invited ICRISAT to set up a major Research Center 
in the Region, embracing the five crops in its mandate. After 
careful deliberation, ICRISAT decided to concentrate on three crops 
- sorghum, millet and groundnuts - that historically had been 
neglected by the British, Portuguese, and German colonial research 
services. Drawing on its West African experience, ICRISAT is 
currently in the process of establishing, on behalf of SADCC, a 
Sorghum and Millet Research Center for Southern Africa at the 
Matopos research station outside Bulawayo in southern Zimbabwe.
Eight ICRISAT scientists at the Matopos Station will develop and
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implement a long term . (20 to 25 year) research program in close 
cooperation with scientists,in national research services - the main 
recipients of ICRISAT's regional program in Southern Africa. To 
summarize, ICRISAT has learned that developing a research and 
training program appropriate to the diverse agro ecological environs*:, 
ments, and the current stage of Africa's absorptive capacity, is a 
long and painful process. ■ The SADCC states stand to benefit from 
ICRISAT's experience in learning how to get its feet on the ground 
in West Africa over the past decade.
Although rice is a minor crop in Africa (3 percent of the 
world's acreage under cultivation), it is an important crop in West 
Africa where urban consumer preferences are rapidly shifting from 
millet, sorghum, cassava and yams to rice and wheat. In fact,-West 
Africa has been importing around a million tons of rice per year 
since the mid 1970s. In 1971, the West African Rice Research 
Institute at Rokupr, Sierra Leone was reconstituted as the West
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African Rice Research Association (WARDA). WARDA's head­
quarters was established in Monrovia, Liberia and it was given a 
mandate to carry out training programs, feasibility studies and 
variety trials in cooperatien with national programs in 15 member 
states. When WARDA was established, it was assumed that IRRI's high 
yielding (irrigated) rice varieties could, be imported by IITA and 
WARDA and screened through variety trials carried out by WARDA in 
member states. It was also assumed that IRAT's research on rainfed 
rice at Bouake, Ivory Coast would produce improved varieties for 
WARDA and national programs. But, after seven years of trials of 
4000 imported mangrove swamp rice varieties, WARDA found that only 
two yielded as well as the best local varieties.—^ Although some 
of IRRI's irrigated rice varieties performed well under farm level 
conditions in West Africa, rainfed rice accounts for 95 percent and 
irrigated rice only 5 percent of the area under rice cultivation in 
West Africa. IRRI has recently stepped up research on dryland rice 
because "two-thirds of the 12.7 million ha of rice land in Latin 
America and Africa is dryland" (IRRI, 1982, p.65) . —f
Because of its disappointing experience with the direct 
importation of new rice varieties from IRRI, WARDA launched Special 
Research Projects in the mid-1970s in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, 
Senegal and the Ivory Coast. But WARDA's Research Department has 
been criticized for keeping too many research scientists at its 
Monrovia headquarters rather than in the countries where Special 
Research Projects are being carried out. Robert Chandler, former 
Director-General of IRRI, noted: "I have not yet seen a good
research program administered by a central urban office unless 
capable scientists were stationed at the locations where the field 
and laboratory work was taking place" (Chandler, 1976). Although 
WARDA receives high praise for its training program, its research
1/ Dunstan Spencer, until recently the Director of WARDA's 
Development Department, reported this result at a 1983 conference at 
Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
2/ Dryland research, includes varieties grown under both rainfed 
and upland farming conditions.
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program is under heavy attack—^ and financial support from member 
states has been flagging in recent years. D.J. Greenland, Deputy 
Director-General of IRRI (and former Director of Research at IITA), 
recently reflected on IRRI's assumption of the early 1970s that 
irrigated varieties could be directly transferred from Asia to 
Africa and adapted for rainfed farming as "a little naive”
(Greenland, 1983). In summary, the direct technology transfer 
assumption of the early 1970s has proven to be a heavy burden for 
WARDA to bear over the past decade.
Livestock is an important enterprise in Mauritania, Mali, Upper 
Volta, Niger, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Botswana and Zimbabwe. But live­
stock improvement has proven to be a difficult problem area for both 
African states and donors. As a result, many studies reporting the 
failure of livestock projects are never published. For example, the 
World Bank has kept Stephen Sandford's consultant report on the World 
Bank's experience with livestock projects in dry tropical Africa 
"under wraps" since it was completed three years ago (Sandford,
1981). A few months later, the Berg Report on Africa did not devote 
a single paragraph to the Bank's experience with livestock, even 
though it was.critical of large-scale irrigation projects of several 
African states (World Bank, 1981).
Fortunately, a few studies of livestock interventions are being
published, including an assessment of a long term project to help
Maasai pastoralists in Tanzania enter the^market economy i^-The
following excerpts from "A New Reality: Western Technology Faces
Pastoralism in the Maasai Project" by Moris and. Hatfield, (1982)
illustrate some of the difficulties in transferring technology (e.g.
U.S. range management practices) to Tanzania with the help of a
technical assistance team over a decade:
"The Maasai Livestock and Range Development Project arose 
from a marriage of national and international concerns 
(p.43)...it began with what now seems naive assumptions 
about the capabilities of western technologies to solve 
Third World problems" (p.60).
1/ See Chandler (1976); TAC (1979) and AID (1983).
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"In the early phases, technical specialists in Maasailand 
viewed techncldgy transfer mainly as adjusting tried and 
true scluticns to the local scene" (p.45).
"The developers saw no problem in replacing the broad 
Tanzanian goal of development of the Maasai with a more 
easily measured proxy objective: achievement of high off
take" (p.50).
"The difficulties that the Maasai Project experienced were 
only partly derived from the cultural features of the 
Maasai people. To a much greater extent they represented 
intrinsic weaknesses cf range management apprcaches, which 
are based upon six premises appropriate only to the Western 
U.S. cultural setting" (p.46).
"By the end of 1978, the team consisted of 10 expatriate 
specialists, none of whom had been involved in the early 
stages of project implementation, nor its planning" (p.44).
"In its day, the Maasai project was thought to be a pioneer 
design fdr medernizing pastoral peoples (p.60). Ten years 
after the establishment of the Maasai Project, its goals 
had not been realized" (p.44)".
Moris and Hatfield, 1982.
We can gain a broader perspective cn livestcck change by 
examining the experience of the International Livestock Center for 
Africa (ILCA). ILCA is' now 10 years old and it seems fair to ask 
what it has accomplished to date. A review of ILCA's record begins 
by examining a 1973 task ferce repert that played a critical role in 
.the,history of the establishment of ILCA in 1974. The task force of 
four livestock specialists was commissioned by the CGIAR to examine 
the state of the art of livestock research in Africa and to suggest 
an agenda for ILCA. The task force report is commonly known as the 
Tribe report.—^ The following excerpts from the Tribe report 
indicate the spirit of optimism in 1973 about available livestock 
technology and the need for social scientists to assist in figuring 
out how to transfer and introduce this technology in the diverse 
pastoral systems throughout Africa:
1/ The team members were Barry Nestel, D.J. Pratt, M. Thorne and 
Derek Tribe (Chairman).
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1. "The accumulated results of many years of study in a wide range 
of disciplines already provides a substantial foundation of 
technical knowledge on which to base development programmes and 
further scientific progress. In particular, outstanding 
advances have been made in animal disease control, which has 
received top priority in most investigational programs. Several 
major livestock disease (e.g. rinderpest, contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia, anthrax, pasteurellosis, and the clostridial 
infections) are already substantially under control or, at 
least, are capable of control given.the appropriate 
infrastructure and organization".
2. "The achievements of veterinary scientists have been supported 
by the work of geneticists, nutritionists, agronomists and 
rangeland ecologists. In country after country such work has 
clearly shown that substantial, improvements in livestock 
production are technically possible provided that healthy, 
well-fed animals of superior genetic quality are grazed 
according to the established tenets of good pasture or rangeland 
management".
3. "It is only now becoming generally recognized that in order to 
develop African livestock industries further it is necessary to 
provide inputs of knowledge in economic and social sciences as 
well as in biological sciences. In most situations, it is ' 
problems concerned with land tenure, credit, taxation and 
marketing, or with human attitudes, education and behaviour that 
limit the application of technical knowledge, and thus the 
developmental process". 4
4. "...the immediate need is for: surveys to determine existing
resources; investigations to identify the most important and 
sensitive social and economic constraints to livestock 
development; and analyses of ongoing development programs 
(monitoring)sin.order to identify the reasons for success or 
failure." (CGIAR, 1973, pp.18-19).
When ILCA was established, a group of social scientists was charged 
with carrying out socio-economic and monitoring studies in different 
countries of Africa. The monitoring of livestock production 
' projects under induced change was designed to prepare a monitoring 
guideline and find out how to remove the socio-cultural constraints 
on some of the technology that was assumed to be available for 
extension services and pastoralists. But after a few years:
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'Monitoring subsequently became a rather unpopular term and 
activity, not because it was not necessary but because it was 
being used and carried out mostly in the project financing 
framework, not totally befitting the character of an 
international research Center such as ILCA" (Anteneh, 1983, 
pp.7-8).
In 1982, a TAC Review Mission identified technical - not socio­
economic - constraints as the critical factors limiting livestock 
improvement in Africa. The TAC mission was critical of ILCA's lack 
of progress in improving the technical research base on livestock 
production, its young and inexperienced staff and its over-emphasis 
on socio-economic baseline studies. The TAC Mission advanced 53 
recommendations, including an urgent appeal to increase the 
scientific research capacity of ILCA by hiring six senior scientists 
to deal with problems such as animal nutrition, health, forage 
legumes, etc. (TAC, 1982). ILCA's new Director-General has taken 
aggressive steps to implement the 53 recommendations and to build up 
ILCA's senior scientific staff.. Since.ILCA is 10 years, it is clear 
that the pay off to investments will likely be forthcoming during 
ILCA's second decade. ILCA's first decade - like ICRISAT's first 
decade - has been spent in getting its feet on the ground in Africa.
Forestry development in the Sahelian region of West Africa 
provides an example of the direct transfer of technology - exotic 
species of trees - to increase fuel wood production. Over the past 
seven years, $160 million of forestry projects have been launched iq 
the Sahel. A landmark paper by Taylor and Soumare (1983) reviews 
some of the problems in developing cost effective fuel wood 
production projects in the Sahel:
1. In Senegal, the exotic species, eucalyptus camalaulensis, 
planted at a cost of $800 +/ha, is estimated to be producing 1.5 
m3/ha/ya while the native acacia seyal forest, bulldozed at high 
cost to plant eucalyptus, is producing between 0.8 m3 and 3.2 
m3/ha/year with an average annual production of between 1-1.5 
m3/ha/year under no management.
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2. In some cases, adequate market studies have not preceded 
plantation establishment. For example, 17,000 steres (8,500 
-hh3), of wood are rotting by the roadside 80 km from Bobo 
Dioulasso in southern Upper Volta because of the lack of a 
market. Fuel wood traders are unwilling to purchase and 
transport it to markets even on highly concessional terms.
3. In Niger, an irrigated fuel wood plantation developed with 
World Bank funding will be discontinued because it is too costly 
to irrigate the plantation.
Taylor and Soumare conclude their bleak assessment of "crash fuel- 
wood projects" by noting that, with the notable exception of Senegal, 
the forestry research infrastructure in place in the Sahel "is so 
small as to be virtually nonexistent". The authors are of the con­
viction that "Forestry research is an essential prerequisite to more 
effective project interventions and it must be given the attention 
it deserves with priority attention to the building of national 
research capability" (Taylor and Soumare, 1982, p.32).
Technology Transfer and African Agriculture: Summing Up
The theoretical case for technology transfer is straightforward. 
There is a proven payoff to scientists working in research teams, 
task forces and institutes. It is assumed that the output of these 
research groups - improved technology' - can be transferred through 
the public and private sectors to clients in other geographical 
settings. Because of the small pools of trained agricultural 
scientists in most African countries (Annex Table 1), the concept of 
importing technology is an attractive proposition in Africa.
The starting point in the analysis of technology transfer in 
practice is to define the concept. Hayemi and Ruttan's three stage 
classification of technology transfer: material (direct), design
and capacity transfer suggests a continuum of interrelated stages. 
Micro computers illustrate the transfer process. In the first 
stage, micro computers can be transferred (material transfer) the 
Third World. In the design stage, local programmers can be trained
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to use the micro computers and software programs can be revised and
adapted to local conditions. In the capacity transfer stage, a
country develops the scientific capacity to produce its own design
of micro computers as Brazil is now doing. But the decision to
develop indigenous scientific capacity to produce new technology is
a major political issue which requires decades of consistent
financial support. A Mexican agricultural economist and recent
Minister of Science and Technology, Edmundo Flores, notes that:
Development may take place in a democracy or a dictatorship, 
under capitalism, socialism, or communism, but it cannot occur 
without a critical mass of specialists in science and techno­
logy. The political decision to develop science and techno­
logy requires shifting a considerable share of the government's 
expenditure to education and research over a long period.
- Edmundo Flores, 1983.
My analysis of technology transfer in Africa has shown that 
numerous plant breeders - e.g. oil palm, cotton, maize - have 
benefitted from imported technology over, a span of many decades.
But in many countries there is a gap between technology transfer in 
theory and in practice. I have shown that some of the IARCs 
operating in Africa, have concentrated on transferring improved 
varieties (material transfer) and have spent little time on capacity 
transfer - i.e. helping national research services and universities 
develop the scientific capacity to screen, borrow and adapt techno­
logy to location specific environments. Most donors have seriously 
underestimated the variability in African agriculture and the indi­
genous science capacity required to achieve the full potential of 
technology transfer. The movement of donor representativesj from 
country to country every two to four years imposes a short term time 
horizon on many foreign assistance programs. Finally, the 
uncritical acceptance of the direct (material) transfer of 
technology creates the comfortaole illusion among many donors that 
it is both possible and feasible to circumvent the long, arduous and 
costly process of strengthening applied and basic research capacity
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within national agricultural research services ana in African 
universities. But Africa's experience with technology transfer in 
25 years of independence adds further evidence to the historical 
record that:
"only a country that establishes its own research capacity in 
agriculture can gain access to the advances in knowledge that 
are available to it from the global scientific community and 
embody that knowledge in the technology suited to its own 
resource and cultural endowments". (Vernon W. Ruttan, 1983,)
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: MAJOR ISSUES
Expanded food production is one of the four cornerstones of 
increasing food security in Africa. Sustained -technological 
innovation is a sine qua non for shifting from a natural resource to 
a science-based agriculture and for increasing food production and 
coping with rapid population growth. In theory, technology transfer 
is an attractive proposition for African states. But, in practice, 
importing technology is critically shaped by the stage of economic 
history of a particular nation. At this stage of Africa's economic 
development, the gap between technology transfer in theory and 
practice is partially a function of limited administrative, 
managerial and indigenous scientific capacity. Unless one has a 
deep understanding of the complexity and diversity of African 
agriculture and a realistic assessment of Africa's present-day 
absorptive capacity, one is likely to overemphasise material (direct) 
technology transfer and underinvest in helping indigenous u.
’ institutions expand their scientific capacity. Unfortunately, long 
term support for strengthening indigenous scientific capacity is 
receiving low priority by most African states and by donors who are, 
for the most part, locked into conservative three to five year 
project cycles.—^
1/ For example, the IDRC of Canada and the ODA of the U.K. have a 
three year limit on projects. The projects are frequently renewed, 
of course, but the time horizon is cautious and conservative.
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..I shall address five major issues about science, technology and 
African agriculture requiring debate and further study.
A Realistic Time Frame: 1985-2000
There is a consensus emerging among scientists that agricultural
Development in Africa - especially in rainfed farming - is a slow,
evolutionary, stepwise process. There is also a growing awareness
that agricultural research is a long term process that should be
conceptualized in time spans of decades rather than years. With
this emerging consensus among scientists on the time frame, the next
step is to gain a consensus among politicians, donors and scientists
on a realistic time frame to meet Africa's food crisis. I am of the
opinion that a period of 15 years (1985 to 2000) is the minimum
feasible planning horizon because:
It will take a period of five to ten years in most states 
to build the political support for a fundamental redirec­
tion in development strategies to give increased support to 
agriculture. *1
It takes an average of 10 years between expenditure on 
agricultural research and the availability of new technology 
and in some cases up to 15. Major payoffs to investments 
in IARCs such as CIAT, ICRISAT, ILCA, will probably come in 
their second decade and for IlTA.it may-reach 20 years or 
more. . : ■,
The lead time for the restructuring and strengthening of 
agrarian institutions such as credit, extension and research 
services must be counted in decades rather than years.
It will take a minimum of 10 - 20 years to train ana 
upgrade human capital for the major agricultural 
institutions.
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs)
In light of some of the problems that the IARCs have encountered 
in establishing relevant programs' in Africa over the past 10 - 15 
years, one should examine two issues: the relative emphasis that
the IARCs should place on material (direct), design and capacity 
transfer and the mandate of the IARCs. On the first question, I 
believe that the IARCs should deemphasize direct technology transfer 
and concentrate on developing regional research networks that assist
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national programs in increasing their scientific capacity to borrow 
technology. Regional research networks covering 6 to 10 countries 
can facilitate linkages and interaction between basic research, 
applied research and extension services.
On the issue of IARC mandates, there is a need to examine whether 
the CGIAR should restrict some of the IARCs to a regional mandate - 
i.e. concentration on food and agricultural research in Africa. A 
TAC team recently examined this problem and concluded that "the 
pursuit of exclusivity in Sub-Saharan Africa is not an evolutionary 
pathway that any International Center should follow. We consider 
that any implication of exclusivity for Sub-Saharan Africa should be 
removed from the IITA mandate" (TAC, 1983, p.14),. But words such as 
evolutionary pathways can be a facile response to a problem meriting 
serious investigation and debate. The following discussion about 
IITA's mandate helps illustrate the need to examine the question of 
mandates for the major IARCs working in Africa. I have observed the 
work of IITA.scientists over the past seventeen years; the mandate 
issue has plagued the IITA since its inception. IITA was originally 
given a manaate to develop improved farming systems in the humid 
tropics; its mandate was subsequently broadened in 1970, 1971, 1972 
ana 1976 to includd:
(a) worldwide responsibility covering all climatic regions for 
research on cowpea, soybean, pigeonpea, lima beans, yams, sweet 
potatoes, plantain, winged beans;
(b) appropriate responsibilities, if asked to do so, within the 
African continent, for other crops (particularly those of inte­
rest in the humid tropics)" for which other institutes have world­
wide responsibility, such as maize, rice and cassava (TAC, 1978,
p .9).
A few months ago an external review team recommended that the IITA 
be given global responsibility for farming systems research in the 
humid and sub-humid tropics (TAC, 1983, p.17). One may legitimately 
raise the question if IITA's FSR program has still not proven itself 
in West Africa, why should it be given global responsibility for the 
humid and sub-humid tropics.
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But the mandate issue is broader than a single IARC. Who will 
assist in maize development in Southern Africa (CIMMYT, IITA or 
both); bean development in East Africa?: and who is responsible
for cassava (IITA or CIAT)? These are some of the many problems 
facing the IARC system. These problems are difficult to resolve in 
the current period of tight budgets.
Strengthening National Research Services 
The major lesson that one draws from Africa's experience in 
importing technology is that national research services should not 
sit back and assume that the thirteen IARCs and multinational seed 
chemical and machinery manufacturers will supply them with new tech­
nology that is appropriate to the needs of smallholders and 
pastoralists. Nor should the national research services think that 
donor funded FSR projects are a substitute for long term projects to 
strengthen the technical and administrative capacity of national 
research services. African states should be encouraged to grasp the 
nettle of the need for a stepped up and consistent national research 
effort as a prerequisite for tapping the regional, continental and 
global agricultural research system. Unless the scientific capacity
i
of national research services is strengthened, the full potential of 
technology transfer from the global agricultural research system 
unfortunately will not be realized.—^
Postgraduate Training in African Universities 
* Over 'the past 2 - 3  years there has been a growing awareness - of 
the need to accelerate postgraduate training in selected fields of 
agriculture in Africa (Eicher, 1982). There is a consensus emerging 
among academic staff and some donors that the time has come to shift 
the center of gravity of postgraduate training from Europe, North 
America and Australia to Africa. A similar consensus was reached 
about 20 years ago in Asia and Latin America.
1/ A micro example of underfunding" of national research services in 
Africa surfaced during the study of the reorganization of 
agricultural research in Malawi. An inventory of the books in the 
library at the central research station (Chitedze) outside Lilongwe 
revealed that 95 percent of the 3000 books in the library were 
published before 1970 (Malawi, 1983).
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In July, the results of an FAO study of agricultural training in 
Africa will be presented at FAO's Regional Conference in Harare. The 
study will show that great strides have been made in B.Sc. level 
training in the past 20 years except in a few critical areas such as 
horticulture, agricultural engineering and food science. The FAO 
study concludes that the next task is to improve the quality of 
undergraduate programs, fill some of the gaps in particular fields 
at the B.Sc. level and expand postgraduate training within Africa, 
with emphasis on the M.Sc. level training.
The USAID office for the Southern Africa Regional Program in 
Harare is in the early stages of developing a long term (20 to 25 
year) Agricultural Training Project. The projected $30 million 
project (years. 1 - 5 )  will focus on strengthening the capacity of 
selected Departments to offer taught M.Sc. programs in various 
disciplines (Blackie, 1984). It is hoped that other donors will 
support this effort and that a long term (2Q to 25 year) plan will 
emerge to avoid Duplication of effort - a problem endemic to 
veterinary medicine training facilities. Much can be learned from 
India's pioneering experiment in postgraduate programs and from 
on-going.experiments, in Morocco, the Cameroon and Brazil.
Implications for Donors
Donors have responded to Africa's food crisis with a doubling of 
aid to Africa in six years - 1975 to 1981.—'f However, aid has 
leveled^ , off in real terms, and there is growing evidence of aid 
fatigue because of the painfully slow progress in improving rainfed 
agriculture in the Sahel (Club du Sahel, 1983), the questional value 
of $2.7 billion of aid to Tanzania from 1973 to 1982, and the 
inability of aid to counter the declining per capita food production 
over the past 15 years. Although the recent drought in the Sahel, 
Ehtiopia and Southern Africa has brought forth renewed interest in 
Africa's food problems, it is common knowledge that aid is not being
1/ On a per capita basis, in 1981 aid flows ranged from an average 
of $12 for all Third World countries, $20 in Africa, $42 in Mali, 
$82 in Senegal and $242 in Cape Verde (Eicher, 1983).
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absorbed with integrity in many countries and that aid coordination 
is simply not working. But in the final analysis, unless donors 
shift their emphasis from short run to long run strategic responses 
to deep-seated problems such as the development of indigenous 
scientific capacity, aid will not achieve its potential.
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Table 1. Selected African Countries Classified by 
Number of Agricultural Scientists and Expenditures on Agricultural 
Research as a Percentage of their Agricultural GDP, 1980
Country Agric. Number of Ag Res Exp
Research Scientists, As % of
Expenditure 1980 AG GDP
($.000 US)
Expenditures over 1 percent of Agricultural GDP
Zimbabwe 10,560 201 2.42
Mali 7,354 68 1.24
Senegal 9,797 105 1.21
Kenya 24,052 400 1.19
Expenditures between 0.5 and 1 percent of Agricultural GDP
Burundi 3,610 41 0.81
Zambia 5,205 109 0.80
Ivory Coast 24,370 212 0.78
Togo 1,892 49 0.76
Malawi 4,562 276 0.75
Nigeria 134,964 1,084 0.74
Lesotho 465 14 0.60
Benin 2,405 19 0.59
Sudan 14,636 164 0.57
Chad ■ 1,602 42 0.56
Expenditures between 0.25 and 0.49 percent of Agricultural GDP
Madagascar 4,801 68 0.39
Tanzania 7,219 256 0.35
Upper VoltaJ/ 1,105 123 0.28
Expenditures under 0.25 percent of Agricultural GDP
Mauritania 284 8 0.22
Sierra Leone 698 35 0.21
Cameroon 3,788 106 0.20
Zaire 5,098 97 0.20
Rwanda 945 24 0.18
Ethiopia 3,400 155 0.18
Ghana 10,095 352 0.17
Liberia 394 20 0.11
Uganda 7,452 175 0.08
1/ Excludes cost of expatriate scientists. 
Source: Adapted from Oram, 1983, p.6.
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